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In, “Why Nothing Mental is Just in The Head,”1 Justin Fisher uses a novel thought-
experiment to argue that every form of mental internalism is false (where mental 
internalism is understood to be the view that, “an individual‟s mental features at a given 
time supervene upon what is in that individual‟s head at that time”2).  This paper shows 
that Fisher fails to refute mental internalism, and that a new variant of his example 
actually (a) confirms a form of mental internalism, as well as (b) John Locke's 
“resemblance thesis,”3 thereby (c) disconfirming all externalist theories of mental content 
(the type of theory Fisher takes his original example to prove).
4
   
§1 reviews Fisher‟s thought-experiment and argument against mental internalism.  
§2 shows that Fisher mischaracterizes mental internalism, and that his example poses no 
threat to narrow functionalism, the view that some mental features supervene on the 
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narrow functional roles internal states play “in the head.”5  §3 constructs and defends a 
new variant of Fisher‟s example.  §4 shows that the example confirms narrow 
functionalism.  §5 shows that the example confirms Locke‟s resemblance thesis, thereby 
refuting externalist theories of mental content.  Finally, §6 raises and responds to an 
externalist objection. 
 
§1. Fisher’s Argument Against Mental Internalism 
Fisher asks us to imagine two beings: a human being on Earth named „Edna‟ and an alien 
on “Pulse World” named „Paula.‟  Edna and Paula are supposed to be engaged in very 
different activities on their respective planets at particular time, t.  Edna is supposed to be 
playing a saxophone on Earth (at t), whereas Paula is supposed to be driving a car along a 
Pulse World highway (at t).  Finally, and most surprisingly, Edna and Paula are supposed 
to be in precisely the same internal state, M, at t.  The explanation of how they are in the 
same internal state is this: Pulse World‟s star emits a form of radiation that systematically 
interferes with neural processing.  Consequently, Pulselings and humans evolved quite 
differently.  Humans evolved such that M is implicated in saxophone-playing.  Pulselings 
evolved such that M is implicated in car-driving. 
Fisher expects some readers to be skeptical.
6
  Could a single internal state really 
function so differently in different physical environments?  Fisher goes to great lengths to 
demonstrate that the example is indeed metaphysically possible.  Although some readers 
may have lingering doubts, the present paper will buttress Fisher‟s argument.  A clear 
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proof of Fisher‟s possibility (and a dramatic new possibility) will be provided in §3.  For 
now, let us investigate Fisher‟s analysis of the example. 
Fisher claims that past externalist thought experiments (e.g. Putnam‟s Twin Earth 
example and Davidson‟s Swampman example) disprove only some forms of mental 
internalism.
7
  For the sake of background, let us look at Fisher‟s analysis of Putnam‟s and 
Davidson‟s examples, and then turn to his analysis of his own example.  Putnam has us 
imagine two individuals: a person on Earth (“Earthling”) and a perfect replica of that 
person on “Twin Earth” (“Twin Earthling”).  Besides obvious differences in physical 
location and numerical identity, there is only one difference between Earth and Twin 
Earth: whereas the stuff Earthling calls “water” has the chemical composition H2O, the 
stuff that Twin Earthling calls “water” has a very different chemical composition, XYZ.  
These facts are widely thought to show that some mental features depend on the external 
world.  For whereas it seems clear that Earthling perceives (and has beliefs about) H20, it 
seems just as clear that Twin Earthling perceives (and has beliefs about) XYZ.
8
  At the 
same time, Putnam‟s example seems to confirm the internalist hypothesis that some 
mental features are just in the head.  For although they have perceptions and beliefs about 
different objects in their environment, it seems clear that Earthling and Twin Earthling 
share a number of perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs “purely in the head.”  They both 
have perceptions, beliefs, and thoughts as of “watery stuff.”  Just as the stuff in Earth‟s 
lakes and rivers look watery to Earthling, the stuff in Twin Earth‟s lakes and rivers looks 
watery to Twin Earthling.  These mental features appear to be “just in the head.” 
 Now turn to Davidson‟s example.  Davidson has us imagine that a fully formed 
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human being – “Swampman” – arises fully formed out of a swamp.  We are to suppose 
that Swampman is a perfect internal duplicate of an actual human being (that he has all of 
the same internal states as, say, you or me).  Davidson‟s example appears to show, much 
like Putnam‟s example, that some mental features depend on an organism‟s causal-
historical relationships to the external world.  For although Swampman may share all of 
my internal states, it seems clear that I have many mental features he lacks.  I remember 
my childhood.  Swampman just seems to remember his (he had none).  I have beliefs 
about cars.  Swampman only appears to have such beliefs (he has never even seen a car).  
And so on.  At the same time, though, just like Putnam‟s example, Davidson‟s example 
appears to confirm the internalist hypothesis that some mental features are just in the 
head.  For clearly, Swampman and I share many mental features.  We both have memory 
states as of childhood, memory states as of having gone to graduate school, and so on.     
Fisher maintains that his example demonstrates for the first time that no mental 
features are just in the head.  His argument is as follows: Edna (the Earthling) and Paula 
(the Pulseling) are in exactly the same internal state, M, at t.  Yet, Edna and Paula share 
no mental features at t.  All of Edna‟s perceptions, beliefs, etc., at t are about saxophones. 
All of Paula‟s mental features at t, on the other hand – all of her perceptions, beliefs, etc. 
– are about cars and freeways.  Since they share no mental features at t but are exactly the 
same “in the head” at t, mental internalism is false.  Two creatures can be the same in the 
head at a given time and share no mental features at all. 
 
§2. Mental Internalism Misconstrued and Narrow Functionalism Untouched 
Fisher assumes, once again, that mental internalism is the view that, “an individual‟s 
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mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individual‟s head at that 
time.”  This cannot be correct, however.  For consider narrow functionalism: the view 
that some mental features supervene solely on the narrow functional role of internal 
states, the functional role those states play purely “in a person‟s head,” abstracting away 
from the external world entirely.  Narrow functionalism is plainly an internalist view.  It 
is also philosophically compelling.  It explains, among other things, why Earthling and 
Twin Earthling (and me and my Swampman duplicate) share mental content.  It says that 
Earthling and Twin Earthling share “watery” perceptions and thoughts because their 
brains are doing the same thing internally (i.e. instantiating “watery” narrow functional 
roles).  Similarly, it says that Swampman and I (as duplicates) duplicate share memories 
as of childhood, beliefs as of cars, etc., because our brains are doing the same thing 
internally (i.e. instantiating the very same “childhood-ish” and “car-ish” narrow 
functional roles).  Narrow functionalism does not, however, satisfy Fisher‟s definition of 
mental internalism.  For the functional characteristics of a given state are not comprised 
by what is the case at a given time.  A state‟s functional role is comprised by the relations 
the state bears to other states, many of which only exist at other times.  As an illustration, 
consider again the idea that Earthling and Twin Earthling share “watery” perceptions and 
thoughts.  What comprises the “watery” narrow functional role of the state they share?  
Something can be individuated as “watery” only by contrasting it against non-watery 
things – by contrasting it against solid things, gassy things, and so on (e.g. watery 
substances are less dense than solid things but more dense than gasses).  A state plays a 
“watery” functional role in a person‟s head, then, just insofar as it relates to other internal 
states that person may have at other times (“solidy” states, “gassy” states, and so on).   
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Mental internalism cannot, therefore, be correctly defined as the view that, “an 
individual‟s mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individual‟s 
head at that time.”  Mental internalism ought to be defined instead as the thesis that that 
an individual‟s mental features at a given time supervene on what is in that individual‟s 
head at different times.  But if this is the right definition, then Fisher has not refuted 
mental internalism.  In order to refute narrow functionalism, Fisher would have to show 
that two creatures could be in exactly the same internal states across time and yet share 
no mental features (at any of those times).  We will now see, however, that this sort of 
case is impossible.  Any two creatures who share perfectly similar internal states across 
time will share many features, regardless of how different their external environments 
may be. 
 
§3. Super Pulse World 
Fisher writes that “a general moral” can be extracted from his example, namely: 
The normal functioning of all cognitive systems deeply depends on their getting 
appropriate support (or at least appropriate non-interference) from their 
surroundings.  For any complex cognitive system, there are possible surroundings 
in which that system would effectively perform cognitive control tasks completely 
different from those it normally performs.
9
 
We will now see that Fisher is right about this, but that he has not fully fleshed out the 
idea‟s actually implications.   
 Let us call “Super Pulse World” a world in which a race of intelligent beings – 
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Super Pulselings – evolved, thanks to a profoundly different physics, to use in general 
the kinds of internal states that Earthlings use to intelligently navigate Earth‟s 
environment to intelligently navigate a profoundly different Super Pulse World 
environment.  Let us assume, in other words, that whereas Earthlings use a series of 
internal states (i.e. states A, B, C, D, etc.) to play saxophones, Super Pulselings use that 
same series to drive cars; and so on, across a wide array of behaviors, such that Edna the 
Earthling and “Super Paula” the Super Pulseling instantiate exactly the same internal 
states over their entire lives while, externally speaking, behaving in profoundly different 
ways. 
Is Super Pulse World a genuine metaphysical possibility?  It is surprisingly easy 
to demonstrate that it is.  Begin with the case of visual cognition.  Two different types of 
facts – empirical facts about the human visual cortex and first-personal phenomenal 
introspection – both strongly support the idea that human visual processing is 
fundamentally “picture-like” (i.e. involving the construction of internal mental images – 
images that are in many respects similar to ordinary photographs).  First, the human 
primary visual cortex has a retinotopic structure.  It is a neural map of the person‟s visual 
field.  Individual neurons in the primary visual cortex appear to function much like 
individual “pixels” in an ordinary bit-map visual display (with individual neurons 
representing points in visual space).
10
  When a human being looks at a saxophone, her 
primary visual neural array fires in a distinctly saxophone-shaped configuration.  The 
primary visual cortex appears, in other words, to create an “internal mental picture” of the 
person‟s visual field.  This idea, of course, fits well with instrospection.  We not only use 
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the language of pictures to describe our visual experiences (we say things like, “I have an 
image of Jane‟s face in my mind right now”); we also describe our visual experiences in 
much the same way that we describe ordinary pictures (e.g., we say things like, “This 
point in my visual field is blue, this point is red, etc.”).   
We can now show that Super Pulse World is at least visually metaphysically 
possible (i.e. Possible with respect to visual cognition).  For it can be shown that any 
picture of one type of object (e.g. a picture of a saxophone) can function as, or serve as, a 
picture of a very different object (e.g. a road).  Here is the demonstration.  Consider an 
ordinary picture of a saxophone (as projected on a computer screen).  This picture is 
nothing more than a series of pixels of different colors (assume for the sake of argument 
that “Pixel #1” has the value “gold”, that “Pixel #2” has the value “silver,” and so on).  
Now turn to a similar picture of a road (on the same computer screen).  This picture too is 
nothing more than a series of pixels of different colors (assume “Pixel #1” has the value 
“black,” “Pixel #2” has the value “grey,” and so on).  Here then is the question: can the 
picture of the saxophone be used to (or function to) represent everything that the picture 
of the road represents (namely, the surface features of a road)?  Clearly.  All one needs to 
do is to apply the following translation rule to the saxophone image: “Change Pixel #1 
from black to gold, change Pixel #2 from grey to silver, etc.”  This rule will for all intents 
and purposes turn the saxophone picture into the road picture.  Finally – and this is the 
critical part – this translation rule could at least in principle be applied externally to the 
picture.  So, for example, suppose the picture of the saxophone is literally in a person‟s 
head (i.e. coded into the retinotopic map in the primary visual cortex).  Here is one way 
mapped onto an external reality of roads: simply build the translation rule (mapping the 
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saxophone picture onto a road picture) into the physics of the world outside of the 
person‟s head.  By building the translation rule into the physical laws of the world outside 
of the person‟s head – building the rule into physical laws relating internal states to the 
external world – the picture of the saxophone in the person‟s head could function as a 
picture of a road, enabling intelligent road-driving behavior.  Notice, indeed, that this is 
true of any series of pictures.  Insofar as every picture in a series of saxophone pictures 
could be mapped onto a corresponding picture in a series of road pictures, any series of 
saxophone pictures (“in a person‟s head”) could, at least in principle, be used to represent 
the surface features of roads (outside of the head, in the external world). 
Now obviously, building such translation rules into the physics of a world would 
be an incredibly complex and gerrymandered affair.  Consider, after all, what one would 
have to do in order to map a series of saxophone pictures onto a series of road pictures.  
One would have to painstakingly map every value of every pixel of every saxophone 
picture onto corresponding pixels of the road photographs.  Super Pulse World is, 
therefore, highly improbable.  It is incredibly unlikely that such a physics exists 
anywhere in our Universe.  The mere fact that a physics is (nomologically) unlikely, 
however, is no reason to think that it is metaphysically impossible.  In order to show that 
something is metaphysically possible (at least according to common philosophical 
practice), all we have to do is show that it is conceivable.  And we have shown that Super 
Pulse World‟s physics is conceivable.  Insofar as there is always some possible mapping 
from a saxophone photograph to a road photograph, it is metaphysically possible in 
principle for a series of saxophone-y visual states “in the head” to function as 
representations of an external world of roads. A god (or Cartesian Demon) could in 
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principle create such a physics.
11
  Super Pulse World is, therefore, metaphysically 
possible (at least in the case of visual representation). 
This argument can be extended straightforwardly to other types of sense 
perception.  For example, consider auditory representation.  Insofar as different sound 
waves differ only in terms of frequency and amplitude, there is always in principle a 
possible mapping rule to “translate” one sound wave into another wave.  So, for example, 
consider the two sound waves in Figure A.  Wave #1 can be translated into Wave #2 by 
simply mapping every point on Wave #1 to every point on Wave #2 (as indicated by the 
arrows in Figure I).  The fact that such a translation exists, however, is just to say that any 
cognitive representation of Wave #1 can be transformed into a cognitive representation of 
Wave #2 (by simply applying the translation rule). 
Figure I 
 
Now, again, mapping sound waves to one another in this sort of way is a highly 
gerrymandered affair.  Still, the point is that it is metaphysically possible.  Fisher, then, 
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was right when he wrote, “For any complex cognitive system, there are possible 
surroundings in which that system would effectively perform cognitive control tasks 
completely different from those it normally performs.”12  Cognitive systems can in 
principle be mapped onto, and so produce very different types of intelligent behavior, in 
profoundly different environments. 
 
§4. Narrow Functionalism Confirmed 
What, if anything, does the Super Pulseling example show?  It clearly confirms narrow 
functionalism.  For although Edna and Super Paula‟s bodies are doing very different 
things (e.g., Edna‟s body is playing a saxophone from t-tn whereas Super Paula‟s body is 
driving a car along a Pulse World highway during t-tn), it is clear that they have the same 
internal mental picture: a qualitatively saxophone-y picture (one whose elements 
qualitatively correspond to the surface features of saxophones, not the surface features of 
roads).  Edna and Super Paula share a number of internal mental features – their minds 
are saxophone-y “on the inside” – for the simple reason that their brains are, at least 
internally speaking, functioning in a saxophone-y way.  Edna and Super Paula have the 
same saxophone-y phenomenal experiences, the same saxophone-y phenomenal beliefs, 
and so on.   
 
§5. Locke’s Resemblance Thesis Confirmed and Pure Externalism Disconfirmed 
What does Super Paula perceive, or believe, when it comes to the external world?  Her 
body certainly drives her car in what looks to be a highly intelligent manner. But what are 
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Super Paula‟s mental contents, really?  Does she see the road in front of her body?  Does 
she have beliefs about it?  Although it may be tempting to say that she does, thanks to her 
body‟s behavior, logical behaviorism is widely agreed false.  Behavior does not a mental 
state make.  In order to know what a person perceives or believes, we should look 
carefully at the biological organ we know to do perceiving, believing, and other mental 
tasks: the brain.  With this in mind, let us look at what Super Paula‟s brain does. 
Consider Super Paula‟s brain.  What does her brain indicate about her?  Super 
Paula‟s body intelligently navigates a world of roads.  Her brain does not, however, 
present the world to her, qualitatively, as the world actually is.  When her body navigates 
roads, Super Paula‟s brain instantiates qualitatively saxophone-y internal mental pictures.  
How, then, can Super Paula be said to see, perceive, or have beliefs about the world of 
roads that stretch out in front of her body?  Her conscious mental life – the realm of her 
conscious experience – simply does not present her with a world of roads.  Super Paula is 
mentally cut off from the external world in the very same way that the classical brain in 
the vat is cut off from its (virtual-reality) world.  She does not see the roads in her 
environment any more than the brain in the vat sees the computer code it is being fed 
(computer code giving it the illusion of seeing tables, chairs, and other people).  Upon 
reflection, it is only Edna (the Earthling) who really sees the external world.  Edna sees 
saxophones because, in addition to bearing the right kinds of causal/external relations to 
saxophones, Edna has something that Super Paula lacks: internal representations that 
qualitatively resemble saxophones. 
 The Super Pulse World case thus demonstrates that Locke‟s resemblance thesis is 
correct and purely externalist theories of mental content are false. Super Paula 
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instantiates every relevant externalist relation to objects in her external environment, yet 
she lacks genuine perceptions or beliefs about its features.  In order to perceive and have 
other mental contents (e.g. beliefs) about the external world, a being‟s internal cognitive 
states must (at least in general) qualitatively represent the world as it really is.
13
 
 
§6. An Externalist Rebuttal? 
Externalists might be tempted to reply as follows: “Even though her experiences are 
qualitatively unlike the external world, there is a very clear sense in which all of Super 
Paula‟s mental states – her perceptions, beliefs, etc. – are about features in her external 
environment.  After all, her mental states detect features of her world (e.g. roads).  Insofar 
as her states detect these features, they are about them (intentionally, and so mentally, 
speaking).”14  All of this is right.  There is a sense in which Super Paula‟s mental states 
are about the external world.  Her mental states do detect features of her environment.  
The problem, however, is with the very sense in which they detect those features.  Super 
Paula‟s mental states detect features of her external environment only in a behavioral 
sense – in the sense that they (the mental states) are used by her body to navigate roads.  
The problem is that this is behaviorism.  Few, if any, philosophers today believe that 
bodily behavior itself is “the mark of the mental.”  Behavior is just that: behavior.  
Consciousness is the mark of the mental.  The Super Pulseling case demonstrates that we 
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only truly see the world (in a robustly mental) sense – I only really have beliefs about 
saxophones – to the extent that the world phenomenally (or consciously) appears to us as 
it is.  The Super Pulseling case demonstrates, in other words, that there are two very 
different kinds of intentionality: purely behavioral intentionality, and genuinely mental 
intentionality.  Externalist theories of “mental content” may be adequate accounts of the 
former; they are not, however, adequate accounts of the latter.  
15 
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